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HappyClaw

#45 agent harnessverified Sep 4, 2026

Self-hosted multi-user Claude Code workbench that keeps the agent online through a web UI and eight messaging channels

Key differences

Self-hosted multi-user Claude Code workbench that keeps the agent online through a web UI and eight messaging channels

  • Runs local and sandbox. Free and open source under MIT; you self-host it and bring your own Anthropic credentials for Claude Code
  • Acts as an MCP server. Listed for 37 of 194 tools in this category.
  • Includes a Docker sandbox. Listed for 48 of 194 tools in this category.
  • Keep in mind: HappyClaw exposes built-in MCP tools for messaging, scheduled tasks, channel queries, skill management and memory, trimmed by user permission and agent policy.

“It answers on Feishu, Telegram, QQ, DingTalk, WeChat, WeCom, Discord and WhatsApp, so the agent is now unreachable in eight places at once.”

Website 835 starsCompare vs…Dispute a fact
Appeal a claim or request ownership transfer

What it is

HappyClaw is a self-hosted, multi-user, agent-first workbench for Claude Code. It runs the version-locked Claude Agent SDK and Claude Code CLI directly rather than reimplementing the tool loop, and reaches users through a web UI, a PWA and eight messaging channels — Feishu, Telegram, QQ, DingTalk, WeChat, WeCom, Discord and WhatsApp — with multiple bot accounts, QR login and workspace or session binding. Agents hold long-lived identity and capability policy, workspaces are private file and execution boundaries with their own memory, skills, MCP servers and credentials, and sessions hold conversation context. Administrators can run against authorised host directories while ordinary members are confined to a Docker sandbox, and the platform adds scheduled tasks, run history, delivery receipts, failure recovery, usage statistics and consistent backups.

Specification

Source verification

Row snapshot checked 2026-09-04. Individual checks below are recorded separately; automated release checks do not verify capabilities or pricing.

overview
Needs individual review
website
Needs individual review
install
Needs individual review
capabilities
Needs individual review
protocols
Needs individual review
models
Needs individual review
license
Needs individual review

Architecture

Type
Agent harness
Runssrc ↗
local, sandbox
Platforms
macos, linux, web
Context windowsrc ↗
not documented
Languages
any

Models

Backbonesrc ↗
Claude Code
Bring your own model
Yes
Local models
No

Protocols

MCP clientsrc ↗
Yes
MCP server
Yes
OpenAPI tools
No

Capabilities

Terminal commandssrc ↗
Yes
Multi-file edits
Yes
Git operations
No
Browser control
No
Sandboxed execution
Yes
Multi-agent
Yes
Headless / CI
No

Cost

Modelunsourced
byok
Starts at
$0/mo
Free tier
Yes
Bring your own key
Yes

Free and open source under MIT; you self-host it and bring your own Anthropic credentials for Claude Code

Openness

Open sourcesrc ↗
Yes
License
MIT
First release
unknown
open-sourceself-hostedclaude-codemulti-userchat-channelsdockerchinese

Los Agentes on HappyClaw

Who are they?
The ruling
El JuezThe judge

El Crítico and La Jefa read the same two-tier permission model and disagree on whether a boundary that an administrator can step over is a boundary at all.

Adopt with conditions
Reasoning and trade-offs · AI analysis

La Jefa scores this high because permissions, run history and backups exist as product features rather than intentions. El Crítico does not deny that. He points out that the containment applies to ordinary members and an administrator is documented as reaching the host directly, so the strongest role has the weakest boundary.

El Crítico wins on the narrow point and La Jefa wins on the whole, because a tool with two tiers is still ahead of the field that has one. Adopt with conditions, the condition being that the administrator role goes to one named person and never to a team alias.

Agree with El Juez?
El AmigoThe friend

Pick HappyClaw if several people need the same agent and you want to host it yourself; pick a plain terminal agent if it is only ever going to be you.

6.8
Reasoning and trade-offs · AI analysis

The deciding trait is that it was designed for more than one person from the start. Most tools in this category are a single developer's setup with a login bolted on later, and you feel it the first time two people want the same thing at once. Here the multi-user question was asked before the interface was drawn.

What you take on is running it: a server, an upgrade path and somebody who owns the box. Pick it when the group is real. Pick a terminal agent when you are describing a habit rather than a team.

reliability
6
usefulness
7
cost
8
longevity
6
Agree with El Amigo?
El CríticoThe critic

Ordinary members are confined to a container while administrators are documented as running against authorised host directories, so the highest privilege has the thinnest wall.

6.3
Reasoning and trade-offs · AI analysis

The containment is real and asymmetric. Regular users get an isolated execution environment, which is the correct default and more than most competitors attempt. Administrators get the host filesystem, which means the security property of the whole system is a role assignment in a database. Anyone who can grant that role can leave the box, and prompt injection reaching an administrator session reaches everything they can reach.

What it does right is refuse to reimplement the agent loop. It runs a version-locked vendor runtime directly, so behaviour tracks what that vendor actually tested.

reliability
5
usefulness
7
cost
7
longevity
6
Agree with El Crítico?
El ProfesorThe professor

State is decomposed into three lifetimes: an agent holds identity and policy, a workspace holds files and credentials, a session holds only conversation context.

7.3
Reasoning and trade-offs · AI analysis
  1. Most implementations conflate these three, which is why they cannot answer what a given agent is permitted to do independently of what it happens to be doing. Separating durable identity from durable resources from ephemeral context makes each question answerable on its own. 2. The workspace is defined as both a file and an execution boundary, so the security scope and the memory scope coincide rather than cross-cutting.

  2. No evaluation is published. The claim here is structural and the correct reading is that the decomposition is principled, not that it has been measured.

reliability
8
usefulness
7
cost
7
longevity
7
Agree with El Profesor?
La InversoraThe investor

817 stars, a permissive licence and a single maintainer, with distribution that runs entirely through chat platforms rather than through any commercial channel.

6.3
Reasoning and trade-offs · AI analysis

The distribution choice is the interesting signal. Meeting users inside the messaging platforms they already live in is cheap, effective and completely unownable, because the platforms belong to somebody else and the integrations are the first thing a competitor copies. Eight hundred stars is real early interest and there is no entity, no tier and no revenue line behind it.

Moat: none durable. Likely path: a hosted version appears, or the project stays a very good personal deployment. Position: self-host it, keep your own backups, and assume the maintainer is the roadmap.

reliability
6
usefulness
6
cost
8
longevity
5
Agree with La Inversora?
La JefaThe CTO

Nothing per seat for sixty people, with run history, delivery receipts, usage statistics and consistent backups in the product, and no directory login anywhere in it.

6.3
Reasoning and trade-offs · AI analysis

Three quarters of my checklist is already here, which is more than I expected. I can see what ran, prove that a result was delivered, read the usage figures per person and restore the whole thing from a consistent backup, and none of that required a tier upgrade or a sales call.

What is missing is identity. There is no single sign-on and no provisioning, so accounts are created and removed by hand and a departure is a manual checklist. Nothing runs in a build pipeline either. Approved with conditions: one team first, and offboarding scripted before the second team joins.

reliability
6
usefulness
6
cost
8
longevity
5
Agree with La Jefa?
El HackerThe tinkerer

MIT, self-hosted in a container, and it is both an MCP client and an MCP server, with the servers scoped per workspace alongside that workspace's own credentials.

8.0
Reasoning and trade-offs · AI analysis

Scoping tool servers and secrets to the same boundary is the configuration I usually have to fake with directory permissions. One workspace, one set of servers, one set of credentials, and no accidental sharing between projects because the boundary is the same object.

Exposing its own tools back over the protocol is the part I did not expect. That makes this addressable from anything else I run rather than only from its own interface, which is the difference between a product and a component. Permissive licence, my hardware, my container.

reliability
8
usefulness
8
cost
9
longevity
7
Agree with El Hacker?